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Based on fieldwork conducted in March 2017 in the communities most affected by the cholera outbreak, 
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If Haiti had to deal with numerous problems over the years – including a number of tropical storms and 
hurricanes, a massive earthquake in January 2010 that killed between 65,000 to 316,000 people, and 
other external shocks such as the worldwide food price inflation in 2008 – however one of the few 
issues that Haiti had not contended with in its recorded history was cholera. This situation changed in 
October 2010. Between 2004 and 2018, the UN has fielded a peacekeeping mission in Haiti, the United 
Nations Stabilization Mission for Haiti (MINUSTAH),1 and some of those peacekeepers brought 
cholera with them.2 The UN did not properly screen its peacekeepers for cholera,3 and poor sanitary 
practices at the UN base contributed to raw fecal waste carrying cholera flowed directly into a stream, 
the Meille River, that runs into a tributary that feeds Haiti’s main river, the Artibonite. Given that vast 
numbers of the population rely on the Artibonite River for washing, cooking, cleaning and drinking, 
cholera quickly spread around many parts of the country. Over 820,000 people have been infected and 
9,792 people died of the illness; however, the real death toll could be the triple of the official figures 
because of the underreporting in the initial outbreak.4 The illness completely upended the life of whole 
communities: children have lost parents and breadwinners, resulting in severe instability and lost 
schooling, and families continue to struggle to pay off debt for medical care and burial expenses, and 
such debt has often plunged them deeper into poverty.5 In January 2020, Haiti celebrated one full year 
 
1 For more on the history of the peacekeeping mission, see: Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, “Chapter 61: United Nations 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH),” in Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 
eds. Joachim A. Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015): 720-730. 
2 Whilst there has been a debate regarding the origin of the disease in the early days of the outbreak, ‘scientific 
evidence now points overwhelmingly to the responsibility of the peacekeeping mission as the source of the 
outbreak’ in the words of the UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights. United Nations, 
‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights,’ UN Doc. A/71/367, 26 August 2016. 
3 UN protocol requires that troops pass a basic health screening. Symptomatic individuals undergo laboratory tests 
for infectious diseases but individuals who do not exhibit active symptoms are not tested. However, many of those 
shedding viable cholera bacteria remain asymptomatic. Furthermore, the South Asian strain of cholera active in 
Haiti has been shown to cause a greater number of asymptomatic cases, to persist longer in the environment, and 
to exist in higher concentrations in faeces. Paul Farmer, Haiti After the Earthquake (New York: Publicaffairs, 
2011): 195. 
4 Rick Gladstone, ‘Cholera Deaths in Haiti Could Far Exceed Official Count’, The New York Times, 18 March 
2016.  
5 International Human Rights Clinic of the Harvard Law School, Bureau des Avocats Internationaux and Institute 
for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, ‘Violations of the Right to Effective Remedy: The UN’s Responsibility for 
Cholera in Haiti,’ Joint Submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation 




of being free of cholera, with no new case reported since the 24th of January 2019.6 However, if the 
illness has been stopped in its tracks, the issue of reparation to the cholera victims has not progressed, 
which has led a group of 14 UN mandate-holders to send an allegation letter to the UN Secretary-
General and Haitian government critiquing the ongoing failure to deliver effective remedies for victims 
of cholera in Haiti. If the worldwide coronavirus crisis brings relief efforts back to the forefront of the 
international community efforts in Haiti, ‘this new threat cannot mask past failures and ongoing 
violations’ in the words of the UN mandate-holders.7 
At first, the UN has relied on its absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts to avoid 
accountability for introducing cholera into Haiti. The UN has also failed to set up alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms in Haiti, leaving victims without any possible avenue to voice their complaints.8 
This policy has been dubbed “morally unconscionable, legally indefensible, and politically self-
defeating” by a UN Special Rapporteur.9 Furthermore, recent scholarship has contested the reliance on 
absolute immunity by organizations such as the UN,10 and practitioners on the ground, representing 
5,000 victims of cholera, have challenged that immunity through the New York District Court. If the 
legal challenge by the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux and the Institute for Justice and Democracy 
 
6 Pan American Health Organization and World Health Organization, ‘Haiti Reaches One-Year Free of Cholera,’ 
23 January 2020, available at:  
https://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15684:haiti-reaches-one-year-free-
of-cholera&Itemid=1926&lang=en  
7 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘UN inaction denies justice for 
Haiti cholera victims, say UN experts,’ 30 April 2020, available at: 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25851&LangID=E  
8 UN General Assembly Resolution 22 (1), Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 
UN Doc. A/RES/22(1) (13 Feb. 1946), s. 29. For a treatment of this issue, see: Rosa Freedman, ‘UN Immunity or 
Impunity?: A Human Rights Based Challenge,’ European Journal of International Law 25 (1) (2014): 239-254. 
9 United Nations, supra n 2. 
10 See for instance: Rosa Freedman and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Immunities 
of the United Nations and Human Rights’ in Cambridge Handbook on Immunities and International Law, eds. 
Tom Ruys, Nicolas Angelet and Luca Ferro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019): 579-594; Rosa 
Freedman and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘Towards an Alternative Interpretations of UN Immunity: A Human 
Rights-Based Approach to the Haiti Cholera Case,’ Questions of International Law 8 (19) (2015): 5-18; Rosa 
Freedman and Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘”Jistis ak reparasyon pou tout viktim kolera MINUSTAH”: The United 
Nations and the Right to Health in Haiti,’ Leiden Journal of International Law 28 (3) (2015): 507-527; Rosa 
Freedman, Nicolas Lemay-Hébert and Siobhan Wills, The Law and Practice of International Peacekeeping: 
Foregrounding Human Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). 
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in Haiti did not result into an effective re-assessment of the UN’s absolute immunity, it certainly 
contributed to add considerable pressure on the organization to modify its stance on the issue.11  
On the 1st of December 2016, in a dramatic turn of events, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon 
finally apologized for the cholera epidemic in Haiti – in English, French and Haitian Creole. If the 
apology fell short of recognizing the UN’s responsibility in the actual outbreak, emphasizing rather a 
‘moral responsibility to act’ and a ‘collective responsibility to deliver,’ it actually led to a ‘New 
Approach’ by the UN, including a $400 million plan as a ‘concrete and sincere expression of the 
Organization’s regret.’12 The UN’s launch of the New Approach presented a critical opportunity to 
repair victims’ injuries and restore trust in the UN.13 In the words of the Secretary-General, it became 
‘an important test’ of the UN’s commitment to its own principles.14 The plan has two tracks: The first 
track focuses on intensified efforts to prevent and eradicate cholera, and the second track promises to 
deliver ‘a package of material assistance and support to those Haitians most directly affected by cholera’ 
to be developed in a victim-centered manner, including through consultations with victims. The plan is 
woefully underfunded – only 4 percent of the amount promised raised so far – with the UN opting for 
relying solely on charitable donations to fund the efforts.15 The result is that more than ten years after 
the initial cholera outbreak, and four years after the UN Secretary General apology, victims are still 
waiting for justice.  
 
11 The added pressure came from a wide array of sources, including excellent reporting on the issue by journalists, 
a high-profile report by the UN Special Rapporteur Philipp Alston, noting that ‘the UN opted to abdicate its 
responsibility’ and blaming the UN’s Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) for coming up with a ‘patently artificial and 
wholly unfounded legal pretence for insisting that the Organization must not take legal responsibility for what it 
has done,’ as well as a diplomatic initiative by University of Birmingham scholars to raise the profile of the cholera 
issue in the UN Security Council debates. See: United Nations, supra n 1; Rosa Freedman and Nicolas Lemay-
Hébert, ‘The Security Council in Practice: Haiti, Cholera, and the Elected Members of the United Nations Security 
Council,’ Leiden Journal of International Law 33 (1) (2020): 157-176. 
12 United Nations General Assembly, ‘A new approach to cholera in Haiti: Report by the Secretary-General,’ UN 
Doc A/71/620, 25 November 2016. 
13 IHRC, BAI and IJDH, supra n 5. 
14 United Nations Secretary General, ‘Secretary-General’s remarks to the General Assembly on a New Approach 
to Address Cholera in Haiti,’ 1 December 2016, available at: 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2016-12-01/secretary-generals-remarks-general-assembly-new-
approach-address  
15 See the constantly updated figures on: http://www.time2deliver.org/  
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There is a discussion in the literature on whether or not gross human rights violations occurring during 
natural disasters should be addressed through transitional justice processes, and in parallel, there is 
international legal momentum behind claims for reparations and compensation.16 The actual role of the 
United Nations in the Haitian tragedy, an actor whose mandate included bringing stability to the 
country, makes this discussion all the more relevant. If other instances of natural disasters are met with 
a relative sense of fatality by Haitians, the discussion took a different turn in Haiti once the clear source 
of the epidemic has been established as the United Nations Nepalese camp near Mirebalais. One could 
argue that all natural disasters include injustices and that massive violations of human rights should be 
properly dealt with, but the case of the cholera epidemic became an emblematic case for Haitians in 
terms of reparations and compensation. 
This article engages directly with the literature on compensation and reparation in transitional justice, 
especially in its socioeconomic dimension, as well as the development literature on cash transfers, to 
inform the current debate on how the international community should compensate cholera victims in 
Haiti. This article makes the point that debates around transitional justice – understood as ‘efforts to 
redress the legacies of massive human rights abuses’17 – can inform the process of finding a right and 
just solution to this issue. This article is based on participative action research conducted by two of the 
authors in the most cholera affected communities in Haiti.18 We followed a team of local lawyers from 
the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux in March 2017 who were meeting local support groups for 
cholera victims and discussing possible compensation avenues with these communities. As such, this 
article aims to bring the voices of the victims to the forefront, connecting their message with debates 
on transitional justice. One of the main findings of our research is the unmitigated desire from local 
communities to access individual reparations instead of the standard collective reparation that is usually 
 
16 Megan Bradley, ‘More Than Misfortune: Recognizing Natural Disasters as a Concern for Transitional Justice,’ 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 11 (3) (2017): 400-420; Pamina Firchow and Roger Mac Ginty, 
‘Reparations and peacebuilding: issues and controversies,’ Human Rights Review 14 (3) (2013): 231. 
17 Pablo De Greiff, ‘Theorizing Transitional Justice,’ in: Transitional Justice, eds Melissa Williams, Rosemary 
Nagy and Jon Elster (New York: New York University Press, 2012), 40; See also: Marita Eastmond, ‘Introduction: 
Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Everyday Life in War-torn Societies,’ Focaal: Journal of Global and 
Historical Anthropology 57 (2010): 3-16. 
18 The research project has received ethical approval from the Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical Review 
Committee, University of Birmingham, in February 2017 (ERN_17-0206), where the lead author of this piece 
was based at the time of the research.  
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presented as the de facto solution for the compensation issue. The UN has outlined two potential 
approaches to material assistance, namely community projects in areas most affected by cholera (the 
community, or collective approach) and payments to the families of those who died (the individual 
approach). The UN has pledged to consult with victims in developing the material assistance package, 
but in practice the UN “has foreclosed that possibility [monetary payments] seemingly without carrying 
out consultations or producing a detailed feasibility assessment” according to the 14 UN-mandate 
holders.19 Hence, according to the same mandate-holders, “compensation is ordinarily a central 
component of the right to an effective remedy, and development projects are simply not a replacement 
for reparations.”20  
This article is divided into three sections. The first section locates the debate around reparations in the 
transitional justice literature, highlighting the growing call for a socio-economic turn in the field. We 
discuss our fieldwork findings in the second section. We focus at the community meetings in Mirebalais 
and how participants have discussed the importance of consultation, but also their positions on 
individual and collective reparations. The third section further links the discussion around individual 
reparations with the development literature on cash transfer, demonstrating that individual reparations 
are not a utopian ideal, but a discussion supported by the evidenced-based research on what works in 
the development field. 
 
Locating reparations within the transitional justice literature: towards a socio-economic turn 
As strategies dealing with human rights violations, reparations are aimed at addressing grievances in 
post-conflict societies. They are generally conceptualized as rights-based political projects seeking to 
give victims due recognition and enhancing civic trust amongst citizens and between citizens and 
institutions.21 As such, reparations are usually considered as a victim-centered transitional justice 
 
19 OHCHR, supra n 7. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ruth Rubio-Marín and Pablo de Greiff, ‘Women and Reparations,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 
1 (3) (2007): 818-336. 
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mechanism responding directly to the victims’ needs and priorities.22 For some, victims have forced 
their way to the front of the transitional justice scene precisely through the mechanism of reparations, 
prompting the field to look beyond traditional justice and truth-telling debates.23 Debates around 
reparations have taken into account both the practical limitations regarding distribution, coverage and 
budgeting as well as philosophical complexities surrounding the rebalancing of power between victims, 
perpetrators and the state.24 As such, understandings of reparations have shifted towards a 
comprehensive process for dealing with victims issues, ‘with the aim of relieving the suffering of and 
affording justice to victims by removing or redressing the consequences of wrongful acts and by 
preventing and deterring violations.’25 As reparations remain concerned with victims as primary 
beneficiaries, they have progressively been identified as channels for improving their socio-economic 
situation, prompting a ‘socio-economic turn’ in transitional justice debates.26 
The field of transitional justice has strong roots in the criminal justice field and has had a strong 
legalistic influence in its foundations. Some have criticized the mainstream literature for marginalizing 
economic, social and cultural rights as a space for engagement, as well as ignoring the socio-economic 
dimensions of past abuses both in theoretical literature and in practice.27 In this regard, some argue for 
the expansion of transitional justice into the realm of redistributive justice, highlighting discrimination 
and marginalization at play through unequal access to socio-economic rights.28 One could argue that 
ignoring the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice limits debates on the possibilities and 
 
22 Lars Waldorf, ‘Anticipating the Past: Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs,’ Social and Legal 
Studies 21(2) (2012): 171-186; See also: Luke Moffett, ‘Transitional Justice and reparations: remedying the past?’ 
in Research Handbook on Transitional Justice, eds Cheryl Lawther, Luke Moffett and Dob Jacobs (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2017), 377-400. 
23 Jemima García-Godos, ‘Victims in Focus,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 10 (2) (2016): 350-
358. 
24  Zinaida Miller, ‘Effects of invisibility: in search of the “economic” in transitional justice.’  International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 2 (2008): 266-291. 
25 Roman David and Susanne Choi Yuk-Ping, ‘Victims on transitional justice: lessons from the reparation of 
human rights abuses in the Czech Republic,’ Human Rights Quarterly 27 (2) (2005): 393.   
26 Jessie Hronešová, ‘Might Makes Right: War Related Payments in BiH,’ Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding 10 (3) (2016): 339-360. 
27 Evelyne Schmid and Aoife Nolan, ‘Do no Harm?  Exploring the scope of economic and social rights in 
transitional justice,’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 8 (3) (2014): 362-382; Louise Arbour, 
‘Economic and social justice for societies in transition,’ NYU Journal of Law and Politics 40 (1) (2007): 1-28; 
Waldorf, supra n 22. 
28 Jemima García-Godos, ‘Victims’ Rights and Distributive Justice: in Search of Actors,’ Human Rights Review 
14 (3) (2013): 241-255; Miller, supra n 24. 
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impact of reparations whilst damaging the prospects of transitional justice mechanisms to deliver 
effective justice and protection to victims. Transitional justice’s bias towards civil and political rights 
is evident in the general claim that the realization of economic, social and cultural rights will come out 
of the fulfilment of civil and political rights.29 Furthermore, post-conflict violations of economic and 
social rights exacerbate earlier structural violence configurations, leading to double-victimization and 
even reducing the possibility of successful prosecution as victims lack socioeconomic assistance.30 The 
invisibilization of economic concerns in transitional justice leads to a focus on ‘negative peace’ rather 
than a ‘positive peace’ challenging the institutions of structural violence in a given society.31  
The debate on reparations and transitional justice offers the opportunity to explore possibilities for 
broadening the field towards socioeconomic justice. Reparations may offer a meeting point between 
development and transitional justice that extends the field into socio-economic and reparative realms.  
Both transitional justice and development practitioners focus on giving victims a voice in decision 
making, converging in the concern with how programs and projects are carried out.32 As mentioned 
previously, in both cases, social exclusion is perceived as one of the central issues in the reproduction 
of structures of inequalities. Lars Waldorf analyses various proposals regarding the connection between 
transitional justice and development, recognizing that the former is centered on corrective justice and 
the latter on distributive justice.33 His analysis points towards transitional justice measures that promote 
inclusive, participatory citizenship and social integration for victims and survivors, establishing 
programmatic links between transitional justice and development. The main question in this regard is 
whether extending transitional justice into socioeconomic considerations is enough to counter the effect 
of neoliberal policies in post-conflict societies, particularly its damaging competition and erosion of 
 
29 Arbour, supra n 27. 
30 Christine Chinkin, ‘The Protection of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Post-Conflict,’ Paper series for the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1 January 2007, available at: 
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/women/docs/Paper_Protection_ESCR.pdf 
31 Dustin Sharp, ‘Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition: Towards a Positive Peace Paradigm for 
Transitional Justice,’ Fordham International Law Journal 35 (3) (2012): 781-814. 
32 Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Katharine Orlovsky, ‘A Complementary Relationship: Reparations and Development,’  
Research Brief, International Center for Transitional Justice, July 2009, available at: 
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Development-Reparations-ResearchBrief-2009-English.pdf. 
33 Waldorf, supra n 22. 
9 
 
resources for welfare and development.34 Equally problematic are situations where reparations activity 
is mandated or overseen by international actors, who tend to act in heavy-handed, securitized, top-down 
manner, which disconnects them from local aspirations of those living in post-conflict societies.35 When 
reparations are viewed as imposed from an outside actor they are unlikely to contribute to peace 
consolidation. To avoid this, reparations require a negotiated process between victim and perpetrator, 
with local oversight so that reparations are deemed legitimate. This also means to take victims’ 
preferences seriously, especially in regard to the choice between collective or individual reparations.  
Both collective and individual reparation schemes have specific aims. For Naomi Roht-Arriaza and 
Katharine Orlovsky, individual reparations recognize specific harm to an individual and the fact that all 
individuals’ lives are worthy and important as a rights bearing citizen, whilst collective reparations seek 
to intrinsically respond to collective harms.36 Individual reparations are integral to regaining civic trust 
whilst collective reparations seek to reinforce social solidarity and to maximize the effectiveness of 
existing state resources. Beyond the obvious monetary compensations, individual reparations may 
include restitution of access and title to property taken or lost, access to employment, a pension, or can 
include medical psychiatric or occupational therapy aimed at rehabilitation.37 In contrast, collective 
reparations can include inter alia the restitution of cultural or religious property, rebuilding destroyed 
or damaged infrastructure, development projects, as well as compensation in the form of services to the 
community.38 For Sriram and García-Godos a way to avoid any limitations inherent to one of the 
reparation schemes is by combining individual and collective reparations, providing a variety of 
measures that can fulfil the needs and interests of victims and be also compatible with development 
orientated policies and programs.39 However, as funding and commitment are notoriously shifty and 
 
34 Padraig McAuliffe, ‘The Prospects for Transitional Justice in Catalyzing Socioeconomic Justice in Postconflict 
States: A Critical Assessment in Light of Somalia’s Transition,’ Northeast African Studies 14 (2) (2014): 77-110. 
35 Firchow and Mac Ginty, supra n 16.  
36 Roht-Arriaza and Orlovsky, supra n. 32. 
37 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, ‘Reparations, Decisions and Dilemmas,’ Hastings International & Comparative Law 
Review 27 (2) (2004): 157-219. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Chandra Sriram and Jemima García-Godos, ‘Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims 
and Ex-Combatants.’  SOAS-University of London and the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, 2012, Available 
at: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/9427227.pdf  
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unpredictable, this limits the ability of actors to provide effective reparations, turning the collective 
versus individual reparation debate into a choice.  
If both collective and individual reparations have their respective merits, it is important to underscore 
the fact that individual measures are crucial, especially as human rights standards are generally 
expressed in individual terms, underscoring the value of each human being and their place as rights-
holders. Individual compensation can ‘allow victims to have agency and choice by supplying the means 
for whatever part of the former life and projects remain possible and may allow for new ones.’40 
Individual reparations avoid considering all victims together which risks minimizing the particular harm 
done or making the meaning of reparations vague.41 Moffett adds to this concern, stating that 
collectivizing victims’ suffering runs the risk of reducing them to an amorphous set of passive, voiceless 
survivors.42 Individual reparations bring an opportunity to redefine as victims those whose living 
standards were depreciated in the day to day rights violations that took place.43 Due to limited resources, 
most actors would steer the conversation towards collective reparation schemes, a tendency which is 
usually contested by human rights advocates insistent on individual reparations.44 Rather than spending 
scarce resources on individual reparations, successor regimes often focus on future-orientated 
development as the field for engagement in reparations as it is perceived to benefit larger social 
groups.45 In this regard, Roht-arriaza and Orlovsky argue that the connecting point between 
development and reparations is social exclusion.46 In the case of reparations, exclusion can be redressed 
by reinforcing the consciousness of survivors as ‘rights holders.’ At the same time, they caution that 
the development-as-reparations approach, when focused on its collective iteration, can undermine this 
ability of reparations to function as an acknowledgment of wrongdoing. 
 
40 Moffett, supra n. 22. 
41 Lisa Magarell, ‘Reparations in Theory and Practice,’ International Centre for Transitional Justice Reparative 
Justice Series, 2007, available at: https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Reparations-Practice-2007-
English.pdf 
42 Moffett, supra n. 22. 
43 Kora Andrieu, ‘Civilizing Peacebuilding: Transitional Justice, Civil Society and the Liberal Paradigm,’ Security 
Dialogue 41 (2010): 537- 558. 
44 Jemima García-Godos, ‘Victim reparations in transitional justice: what is at stake and why.’  Nordisk Tidsskrift 
for Menneskerettigheter 26(2) (2008): 111-130. 
45 Waldorf, supra n. 22. 
46 Roht-Arriaza and Orlovsky, supra n. 32. 
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Individual reparations come with its own share of issues as well and the aim of this article is not to 
completely obscure this aspect of the conversation. Individual reparations require a precise 
identification of the persons entitled to them as a form of delivering concrete benefits to the individual 
recipient.47 This turns the determination of beneficiaries into an exercise beset with logistical, moral 
and political challenges.48 For instance, acknowledging individuals deserving redress can give rise to 
competition between victims over the individual conditions of eligibility.49 This has to do with how the 
definition of victim needs to be considered within a specific social context, as it is usually charged with 
contested historical, political and moral meanings.50 Reparation schemes requiring definition of a 
determined number of potential beneficiaries can create hierarchies of victimhood where one victim is 
worth more than the other by being entitled to higher payments or benefits.51 Individual reparations can 
also lead to contestation: those compensated potentially objecting to reparations being incomplete, those 
not compensated may insist on how their suffering has been denied.52 Those asked to provide 
compensation can object to an excessively broad definition of beneficiaries, others will object that 
individual reparations will come at the expense of public projects that potentially improve collective 
welfare.53 Having said that, issues also arise with collective reparations, especially when the 
developmental responsibilities of governments are displaced by actors ‘stepping in’ and providing 
collective reparations.54  
Furthermore, reparations also require connection with apologies, and a public acknowledgment of the 
perpetration of past violations. However, apologies also generate controversy when disconnected from 
concrete measures at individual and/or collective level.55 In their symbolic dimension, reparations need 
 
47 Magarell, supra n. 41. 
48 Moffett, supra n. 22. 
49 Luke Moffett, ‘Reparations in Transitional Justice: Justice or Political Compromise?’ Human Rights and 
International Legal Discourse 17 (1) (2017): 1-16. 
50 Jemima García-Godos, ‘Victims in Focus’, International Journal of Transitional Justice 10 (2) (2016): 350-
358. 
51 Hronešová, supra n. 26. 
52 David Gray, ‘A No Excuse Approach to Transitional Justice: Reparations as Tools of Extraordinary Justice,’ 
Washington University Law Review 87 (5) (2010): 1043-1103. 
53 Ibid. 
54 García-Godos, supra n. 44. 
55 Ruben Carranza, Cristian Correa and Elena Naughton, ‘More than Words: Apologies as a Form of Reparation,’ 
International Centre for Transitional Justice, December 2015, available at: 
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Report-Apologies-2015.pdf    
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to come directly from perpetrators and states, connected to apology and acknowledgment of victim 
harm. Symbolic reparations turn problematic when they are not accompanied by more tangible benefits, 
being interpreted as empty words without any serious commitment to victims.56 In this regard, symbolic 
reparations not only require complementation with material compensation but also with other 
transitional mechanisms. Reparations in absence of truth-telling and recognition are likely to be 
interpreted by victims as an effort to buy their acquiescence, or in the worst of cases the payment of 
blood money.57 Reparations without retributive justice or accountability often fail to change the living 
circumstances of victims and without vetting and lustration, it is impossible for reparations on their own 
to contribute to rebuilding trust.58  
Academic discussions regarding reparations point towards a key factor determining how reparation 
policies operate: the importance of context and socioeconomic needs that underpin the demands from 
victims of human rights violations. The socio-political context of each country in transition plays a 
determining role in shaping the conceptual framework upon which a reparations program is based, 
turning reparations into a social process where the past is subject to reinterpretation.59 As reparations 
are the most tangible expression of the addressing of harms endured by victims, they give the victims 
socio-political agency.60 This is evident in the fact that victim’s reparative demands often focus on 
changing of state or other actor’s behavior (in our case, the UN). Recognizing the influence of a 
country’s context for establishing reparations turn them into sites for political, economic and legal 
contestation as to their commitment in dealing with the past and preventing future violence; reparations 
carry a fundamental message about which individuals and harm are deemed worthy of recognition and 
remedy.61 Seeing reparations as a contested social process implies identifying the social actors involved 
 
56 García-Godos, supra n. 44. 
57 Alexander Boraine, ‘Transitional Justice: a Holistic Interpretation.’ Journal of International Affairs 60 (1) 
(2006): 17-27; De Greiff, supra n 17. 
58 De Greiff, supra n. 17. 
59 García-Godos, supra n. 44. 
60 Boraine, supra n. 63. 
61 Moffett, supra n. 49. 
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in contestation and negotiation of both the terms of engagement and the content or form of reparation 
programs.62  
 
What do the Haitians want?  
The UN Development Programme (UNDP) has been tasked with undertaking consultations with victims 
owing to their expertise on community-based approaches. However, there is a fear that consultations 
might raise expectations, especially in terms of individual reparations which are deemed difficult to 
achieve.63 There is also a recognition that projects undertaken under Track 1 and 2 may well be the 
same projects, the difference being that Track 2 has a ‘symbolic aspect’.64 In order to know what victims 
thought about reparations and their preference for specific scheme, we followed Haitian lawyers from 
BAI on the field. The data was gathered between the 14th and the 16th of March 2017 in rural localities 
around Mirebalais in the Artibonite region, where cholera first broke out and where some of the most 
affected communities are located. We have done three separate trips to the Mirebalais region: one in La 
Chapelle (Lachapèl), one in Saut-d’Eau (or Sodo), and one in Boucan-Carré (Boukan Karé). Different 
neighboring communities were represented in each of these meetings.65  
The sessions took place in communal buildings such as a church or a school, and all victims and their 
families were invited to attend. Each session began with a video screening of Ban Ki-Moon’s apology 
to the cholera victims. It was the first time that most victims had seen the video or had heard the words 
spoken by the former UN Secretary-General. After being explained the meaning of this apology by the 
Haitian lawyers, victims were told that the most important and meaningful part of the apology was when 
Ban Ki-Moon acknowledged that ‘apologies do not cure diseases,’ which was a way to introduce the 
reparation issue by the Haitian lawyers. Large and small group discussions focused on what the different 
 
62 Jemima García-Godos, ‘Victims Rights and Distributive Justice: in Search of Actors,’ Human Rights Review 
14 (3) (2013): 241-255. 
63 Interview with Nadine Therer, Deputy Country Director (Haiti), UNDP, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 13 March 2017. 
64 Ibid. 
65 For La Chapelle: Lépinard; Mathurin; La Croix; Joly; Ciprit; Ravine Canot; Haute au vent. For Seau-D’Eau: 
Carrefour Seau-D’Eau; Dubuisson; Lamarre; Filate; Gilo. For Boucan-Carré: Daman; Terre Blanche; Bois Cochon; 
Chapeauto; Cite Lila; Peligne.   
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communities want from the UN. Individuals explained why they wanted to be consulted, and the types 
of remedies they are seeking from the United Nations. As researchers, we have listened and followed 
discussions regarding the establishment of these groups of victims, without intervening in the process. 
We have opted to hold one focus group at the end of each day, to discuss the issues related to reparations 
without interfering too much with the work of the lawyers we were following. The focus groups were 
conducted in Creole (unless specific participants wanted to express opinions in French), and were 
translated in French or English by one lawyer from the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti 
accompanying us on this trip. Our conclusions are drawn from these focus groups, and can be grouped 
around three distinct themes: the benefit of consultations; the issues with collective remedies; and the 
benefits of individual remedies. 
 
The Benefit of Consultations 
Most participants in the focus groups were absolutely adamant about the importance of the consultations 
with the United Nations. As one of the participants mentioned,  
‘it is important that they hear about our suffering. When cholera broke out people would 
die on the roads, people were dying on the way to hospital. We didn’t have money for 
burials. Neighbours would chip in for funeral costs. We are left with the bill. We need to 
be paid back for that. What we want is a dialogue to get everyone reparations. They should 
come to talk to us even if they cannot give us everything we ask for. We will listen, we will 
respond, we will have proposals for them. They should talk to us and not to the state.’  
The distrust of the state - a theme that has long tradition in Haiti66 - was picked up by most participants, 
fearing that the state officials would not represent the interests of the victims. According to a participant: 
‘we know whenever they [state officials] are involved in making decisions they don’t come to us and 
 
66 See: Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘Resistance in the Time of Cholera: The Limits of Stabilization Through 
Securitization in Haiti,’ International Peacekeeping 21 (2) (2014): 198-213; Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, ‘Living in 
the Yellow Zone: The Political Geography of Intervention in Haiti,’ Political Geography 67 (2018): 88-99. 
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ask, they just do what is good for them. They are always looking after themselves; and the people who 
are victims will not get anything.’ For another participant, the message was quite clear: ‘don’t consult 
with the state. The state only wants to enrich itself. The state takes things for itself. We would prefer to 
be in direct conversation with the UN and not for them to go to the state.’ Finally, according to yet 
another participant, ‘the state abuses our rights – the UN shouldn’t go to the state. The state will give 
false information. They need to have a sense of the real situation down here, to really understand the 
victims’ point of view. They are too many corridors with the state. The truth will get lost.’ This is a 
quick poetic way to raise issue of (mis)representation of the population and victims by the state elite, 
but this underlines also the issue deemed crucial by participants, that is the need to hear victims directly, 
and the need for the United Nations to really understand the local priorities. According to a participant: 
‘it is important to consult with us. We are the victims. We want to tell our priorities. Maybe we can go 
further together. In any case they can come and hear from us and use it as the basis for their analysis. 
Consulting local victims groups will enable the UN to have a better sense of priorities.’ 
 
The Issues with Collective Reparations 
When asked what type of reparations – collective or individual – the different victim groups would 
privilege, every single one of them mentioned individual reparations, and two groups out of 18 wanted 
individual and collective reparations at the same time. Not a single group mentioned a preference for 
collective reparations over individual reparations. The main reason is rooted in the experience of most 
Haitians living in the countryside had with the state and with international aid. Haitian history is marked 
by constant social struggles between the political and economic elite and the moun andeyo (or 
outsiders), those who are not considered part of the nation and are excluded from its benefits and 
recognition.67 As such, asking mainly self-subsistence farmers, living in the countryside, to trust the 
state or the ‘international community’ to deliver on promises (in this case, community projects) is 
 
67  Gérard Barthélémy, L'Univers Rural Haïtien: Le Pays en Dehors [The Rural Haitian Universe: The Outside 
Country] (Port-au-Prince: Henri Deschamps, 1989). 
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simply too much to ask for many. As one of the participants indicated: ‘we spent money to get to 
hospital. We don’t trust the state. It says it will give us free schools but we still have to pay for them. 
Hospitals are promised but not built. Roads are promised but not built. If collective remedies happen 
all we will get is big cars driving past and blowing more dust into our face’. The reality that the promised 
projects may never actually happen or be massively delayed also led another participant to say ‘by the 
time the health center is built, all of the cholera victims will have died.’  
Some also pointed out that this will not help to lift people who have suffered from poverty. This led a 
participant to ask a simple question: ‘why should the state be given the money when they will keep it 
for themselves and we who suffered will never see any benefit from it?’ According to another 
participant to ask another question: ‘what about the people where the father of the house died and the 
family is in a really bad situation? It isn’t that new projects are bad – they are good. But these families 
had a shock. New projects will leave people where they are vis-à-vis other people. They need individual 
remedies to get them back on the path.’ 
The collective projects are also unlikely to reach to the remote communities and to help specifically the 
most destitute. Collective projects such as health clinics or schools will create jobs, but probably jobs 
needing specific training: ‘if the UN gives other forms of [collective] help it will help people who have 
a little bit of education. It will not help those who need to get back onto their feet’. For another 
participant, ‘for people in far-away rural zones, they will not have access to services or to projects if 
collective ones are provided’. For yet another participant, ‘community projects would be good but we 
need to think about the structure of how they will come. We need to think about the country we are in. 
Those who are connected will benefit but the little farmers most affected by cholera will not benefit 
from collective projects.’  
Finally, participants also pointed out that the collective projects being discussed fall within the remit of 
the Haitian state, and the international community should not stand in for the state. For a participant, 
‘yes, health centers are good, food is good, all these things are good. But the state has the obligation to 
give us these things. We lost our wives, our children, and now the state wants to let them [the UN] give 
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us things the state has obligations to give us. The state will keep the money but it is us who suffered 
and should have the money.’ For another participant, who was in favor of both collective and individual 
reparations:  
‘In general collective projects are good. For example in a very rural zone where people had 
to go on a goat to find a car to get to hospital, a health centre would benefit them greatly 
especially if another sickness comes. Community projects are good. They are the state’s 
responsibility but in Haiti the state doesn’t do it, so if the UN has money for building health 
centres then they should do it. But that does not mean we should not get individual 
payments’. 
 
The Benefits of Individual Reparations 
For many participants, it all comes down to individual situations, with specific families being more 
impacted than others and needing financial support as soon as possible: ‘we did not suffer collectively. 
Each person suffered individually. We were personally sick in our own bodies’. From the participants’ 
perspective, the main benefit of individual reparations is that it is tailored to local needs, respecting 
local agency in choosing the best way to deal with the loss of income incurred by the illness. As one 
participant mentioned, ‘we want individual remedies. We want the money to come into our own hands 
so that if we get sick again we can look after ourselves.’ For another participant, ‘we just want to be put 
back on the path, to be given back the money we spent with our fingers.’ The personal situation can 
also differ. For one participant: ‘I just want to buy back my land so that I can have enough money to 
pay for my children to go to school’. For yet another, ‘when we were sick we were the ones who had to 
spend money. We had to sell livestock to go far away to hospital in Mirebalais. To get there we needed 
a car, and we don’t have cars so we had to pay for that and to pay for medicine’. For a participant, 
individual reparation can lead to economic growth: ‘assistance to do commercial activity would help 
them [people who lost family members] to recover’. Individual reparations can also help reach children: 
‘the people who especially need compensation are children who lost their mother and can’t go to school 
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or to university. Many children lost family members and the UN should give them assistance to spend 
on activities or a garden or school or things to make their lives better’.   
 
Are individual reparations realistic? Insights from the cash transfer literature 
Despite the overwhelming preference for individual reparations as expressed by victims, the UN has 
made a unilateral decision to foreclose compensation in favor of community projects. The UN has 
established platforms to ‘support the project in the communities, serving as an interface between the 
project itself and the targeted areas’68 in the Cap-Haitien area. Hence, the only material assistance 
offered by the UN to date is 20 projects in four communes around Cap-Haïtien, and five $150,000 
infrastructure projects around Mirebalais.69 As previously mentioned, the UN Special rapporteurs 
pointed out that ‘some victims prefer monetary payments, an option that was once on the table, but the 
UN has foreclosed that possibility seemingly without carrying out consultations or producing a detailed 
feasibility assessment.’ Whilst, ‘compensation is ordinarily a central component of the right to an 
effective remedy, and development projects are simply not a replacement for reparations.’70 When we 
interviewed MINUSTAH staff in 2017, we could sense that there was a lot of anxiety over opening up 
the option of compensations to victims, with reservations about the logistics, the potentially spiraling 
cost of such a program, as well as the actual efficiency of compensations in achieving development 
objectives on the ground. This section does not aim to answer all these questions – which could be 
subject to an additional article – but rather aims to bring into the conversation the growing literature on 
cash transfer programs in development studies, especially seeing how the UN has opted to go with 
‘traditional’ development projects.  
 
68 UNDP, UN Haiti Cholera Response MPTF PROJECT QARTERLY PROGRESS REPORT Period (Quarter-
Year): 4th Q2019 as of 31 December 2019, available at: http://mdtf.undp.org/document/download/23711  
69 IHRC, BAI and IJDH, supra n. 4. 
70 OHCHR, supra n. 6. 
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Over the past twenty-five years a ‘quiet revolution’ has seen governments in the developing world 
invest in increasingly large-scale cash transfer programs.71 There are over 130 low- and middle-income 
countries that have at least one non-contributory unconditional cash transfer (UCT) programs in place, 
with even more conditional cash transfer programs operating in parallel.72 First and foremost, while 
cash transfers are not a panacea for development, it empowers individual recipients as decisionmakers, 
promoting a ‘rights-based approach to development.’73 Cash transfers are particularly appropriate in 
situations where it is either physically difficult to reach the poorest and those in need (such as in the 
aftermath of disasters or conflicts), or because the state infrastructure is simply excluding the poorest 
from its reach, as this is certainly the case in Haiti. Cash transfers are ‘transformative,’ increasing 
individuals’ sense of self-worth, dignity, and assertiveness.74 It was also noted that ‘unconditional cash 
transfers have significant impacts on economic outcomes and psychological well-being.’75 
Chris Blattman has demonstrated that ‘cash grants to the poor are as good as or better than many 
traditional forms of aid when it comes to reducing poverty. Study after study has shown that recipients 
of cash grants invest the money or spend it on such basic items as food and better shelter. Poor people 
don’t always make the best choices with their money, of course, but fears that they consistently waste 
it are simply not borne out in the available data.’76 Actually, a systematic review of all the evidence on 
the effects of cash transfers on individuals and households over 15 years, from 2000 to 2015 (including 
 
71 UK Department for International Development, Cash Transfers: Literature Review, Policy Division, April 
2011, available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/cash-transfers-literature-review.pdf  
72 Francesca Bastagli et al. ‘Cash transfers: what does the evidence say? A rigorous review of programme impact 
and the role of design and implementation features,’ London: Overseas Development Institute, July 2016, 13, 
available at: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11316.pdf. We will not discuss the 
specifics about the conditional versus unconditional cash transfer programs, as this has limited benefits to the 
current discussion. Rather, we will focus primarily on unconditional cash transfer schemes, as this would be 
potentially more suitable for any reparation scheme to the victims of cholera in Haiti.     
73 George Ingram and John MacArthur, ‘From one to many: Cash transfer debates in ending extreme poverty,’ 
Brookings Institution, 19 December 2018, available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-
development/2018/12/19/from-one-to-many-cash-transfer-debates-in-ending-extreme-poverty/  
74 Maxine Molyneux, Nicola Jones and Fiona Samuels, ‘Can Cash Transfer Programmes Have “Transformative” 
Effects?’ The Journal of Development Studies 52 (8) (2016): 1095.  
75 Johannes Haushofer and Jeremy Shapiro, ‘The Short-Term Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers to the Poor: 
Experimental Evidence from Kenya,’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics 131 (4) (2016): 1973-2042. 
76 Christopher Blattman and Paul Niehaus, ‘Show Them the Money: Why Giving Cash Helps Alleviate Poverty,’ 
Foreign Affairs 93 (3) (2014): 117-126.  
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201 studies) reflects ‘how powerful a policy instrument cash transfers can be, and highlights the range 
of potential benefits for beneficiaries.’77 
Amongst the main worries about cash transfer programs, some point that price effects are feared.78 
There is also traditional paternalistic arguments at play,79 with some actors doubting that poor people 
can make reasonable and well-informed choices. The systemic review of the cash transfer literature 
demonstrates that the evidence does not support these concerns and that ‘for studies reporting 
statistically significant results, the vast majority are in the direction policy-makers intend to achieve.’80 
As previously mentioned, cash transfer programs are not necessarily a panacea, but any discussion of 
their limitations should happen in conjunction with a discussion of the limitations of ‘traditional’ 
development project as well.81 
 
Conclusion 
The New UN Plan for Haiti includes both a commitment to consult with victims, and a preference for 
collective reparations, even if in principle all options are open. In our meetings, the victims clearly 
expressed the willingness to meet with and talk to UN officials, but also expressed a strong preference 
for individual reparations. For many individuals, collective projects are not always followed through 
(by international NGOs or by the government), and these projects also tend to favour those who are 
already in position to benefit from them, including through the staffing of the projects once completed. 
Hence, the perception is that these projects will exclude those who are not in position to benefit from 
these projects, including the most vulnerable segment of the population and the population living in the 
 
77 Bastagli et al. supra n 42. 
78 Jesse Cunha, Giacomo de Giorgi and Seema Jayachandran, ‘The Price Effects of Cash Versus In-Kind 
Transfers,’ Review of Economic Studies 86 (2019): 240-281; Deon Filmer et al., ‘Cash Transfers, Food Prices, 
and Nutrition Impacts on Nonbeneficiary Children,’ Policy Research Working Paper 8377, World Bank, March 
2018.  
79 Janet Currie and Firouz Gahvari, ‘Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data,’ Journal of Economic 
Literature 46 (2) (2008): 333-383. 
80 Bastagli et al., supra n. 46, 12-13.  
81 See the impact of traditional development aid on the labor market in Haiti: Nicolas Lemay-Hébert et al., ‘The 
internal brain drain: foreign aid, hiring practices, and international migration,’ Disasters (2019), online first. 
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countryside. Finally, collective projects do not target specifically those who have been affected by the 
illness, and who are currently struggling to make ends meet. Individual reparations, in contrast, enable 
to target specific individuals and families who have suffered and continue to suffer emotionally and 
economically from the consequences of the illness.  
Most of the participants also emphasized the need to move quickly, a call which does not seem to be 
heeded by the UN and other international donors so far. For one participant, ‘what is important is that 
the UN moves fast because our situation is so bad. Lots of girls cannot go to school because we had to 
sell land and livestock and get unto debt to pay for cholera. We can’t earn properly since then’. For 
another participant, ‘there are still a lot of health problems (…) it needs to happen quickly. The UN 
should act quickly’. The current instability, compounded by the impacts of the coronavirus pandemic, 
makes the situation of the poorest segments of the Haitian population all the more precarious. However, 
calls for urgent action seem to have fallen on deaf ears, as more than 4 years have passed since Ban Ki-
Moon’s apology and only meagre resources have been mobilized to help the victims. 
When trying to make sense of the UN discrepancy between words and actions, one has to take into 
consideration the fact that a Haitian life seems to be worth less than a life in most Western countries. 
For the UN Special Rapporteur Philip Alston, the only way to understand the UN’s ‘reprehensible 
conduct’ in Haiti is to accept that ‘an element of racism is involved here,’ with Haiti being considered 
a country ‘which has largely been written off.’82 If a previous report by Alston helped push the UN and 
its Secretary General at the time to change its stance on the issue, we hope the recent letter by the 14 
UN mandate-holders might also push the UN to do what is right for the Haitian victims. 
 
 
82 Ed Pilkington, “UN Response to Haiti Cholera Epidemic Lambasted by its own Rights Monitors”, The 
Guardian, 4 May 2020.  
